Thornell v. Jones, 602 U.S. ___ (2024) (2024)

NOTICE: This opinion is subject toformal revision before publication in the United States Reports.Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, SupremeCourt of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543,pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formalerrors.SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES_________________No. 22–982_________________RYAN THORNELL, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OFCORRECTIONS, PETITIONER v. DANNY LEE JONESon writ of certiorari to the united statescourt of appeals for the ninth circuit[May 30, 2024]Justice Alito delivered the opinion of theCourt.In this case, we review a decision of the NinthCircuit ordering the resentencing of a defendant who, in order tosteal a gun collection, committed three gruesome killings,including the cold-blooded murder of a 7-year-old girl. The NinthCircuit held that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to theeffective assistance of counsel was violated during the sentencingphase of his capital trial. In reaching this conclusion, the NinthCircuit substantially departed from the well-established standardarticulated by this Court in Strickland v.Washington, 466 U.S.668 (1984). Among other things, the Ninth Circuit all butignored the strong aggravating circ*mstances in this case. As aresult, we must reverse the judgment below.IAThirty-two years ago, Danny Lee Jones murderedRobert Weaver, his 7-year-old daughter Tisha Weaver, and hisgrandmother Katherine Gumina. Jones knew that Robert owned a $2,000gun collection, and after spending a day drinking and talking withRobert, Jones decided he wanted to steal the guns. He grabbed abaseball bat, beat Robert into unconsciousness, and headed indoorsto find the collection.Once inside, Jones encountered Gumina, who waswatching television, and Tisha, who was coloring in a workbookbefore heading to bed. Jones struck Gumina hard enough to crack herskull, leaving her unconscious on the living room floor. Tishaapparently watched Jones attack her great-grandmother and ran tohide under her parents’ bed. Marks on the carpet show that Jonesdragged the girl out from under the bed before beating her hardenough “to create a wound several inches wide, extending from herleft ear to her left cheek.” State v. Jones, 185Ariz. 471, 489, 917 P.2d 200, 218 (1996). Jones then asphyxiated Tisha with apillow.Jones next began loading Robert’s guns intoGumina’s car. At that point, Robert regained consciousness. “Bloodsmears at the scene showed that [Robert] attempted to run from”Jones, but Jones “struck [him] in the head several more times. Thelast blow ... was delivered while [Robert] knelthelplessly on the floor of the garage.” 9 Appellant’s Excerpts ofRecord in No. 18–99005 (CA9), p. 2449 (Record). Jones then skippedtown with the guns, using them to pay for a trip to Las Vegas.A short time later, Robert’s wife came home fromwork and discovered the gruesome scene. She called 911, but thefirst responders found that Robert and Tisha were already dead.Gumina lived for 17 months before succumbing to her injuries.Before Gumina died, Jones was charged with two counts ofpremeditated first-degree murder and one count of attemptedpremeditated first-degree murder, and a jury found him guilty onall three charges.[1]BAfter Jones was convicted, the trial courtproceeded to sentencing. Under Arizona law at the time, the courtwas required to “impose a sentence of death” if it found “one ormore” statutorily enumerated “aggravating circ*mstances” and “nomitigating circ*mstances sufficiently substantial to call forleniency.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–703(E) (1993).The trial court found three aggravatingcirc*mstances that applied to both Robert’s and Tisha’s murders.First, Jones committed multiple homicides “during the commission ofthe offense.” §13–703(F)(8). Second, he was motivated by“pecuniary” gain, namely, Robert’s guns. §13–703(F)(5). And third,the murders were “especially heinous, cruel or depraved.”§13–703(F)(6). With respect to Tisha’s murder, the court found anadditional aggravating circ*mstance: She was a young child.§13–703(F)(9).The trial court also heard mitigating evidence.The presentence report noted that Jones was abused as a child,began using drugs and alcohol at age 13, suffered brain trauma atages 9 and 18, and had received “psychiatric treatments” as achild. 4 Record 1086–1088. Jones’s second stepfather, Randy,described Jones’s troubled personal life. He testified that Jones’sfather and first stepfather were physically abusive, that Jones’sgrandfather and uncle had introduced him to drugs as a preteen, andthat Jones had suffered several head injuries that left him with“constan[t]” headaches. 9 id., at 2522–2526.Jones’s counsel also submitted a report by andsolicited testimony from Dr. Jack Potts, a court-appointed forensicpsychiatrist who was later described by counsel as essentially“part of the defense team.” 7 id., at 1831. Dr. Pottsidentified several “mitigating factors” that he thought warrantedleniency. 4 id., at 1070–1071. First, he noted that Jones“was reared in a chaotic and at times grossly hostile environmentwhere physical abuse was too prevalent.” Id., at 1069. “Theyears he had of a relatively ‘normal’ childhood,” Dr. Potts opined,were “too late ... to counter the earlier abuse.”Id., at 1070. Second, Dr. Potts suggested that Jones’s“serious head trauma” potentially “contribut[ed] to his behavior.”Id., at 1068, 1071. Third, he concluded with a “reasonabledegree of medical certainty” that Jones “suffers from a majormental illness,” likely a “form of Bipolar Affective Disorder.”Id., at 1070; 10 id., at 2567. Fourth, he thoughtJones was “genetic[ally]” predisposed to “substance abuse” andspeculated that Jones would not have murdered had he been sober. 4id., at 1070. Fifth, Dr. Potts believed that Jones felt“remorse and responsibility” and that he had the “potential forrehabilitation.” Id., at 1070–1071.From this evidence, the trial court concludedthat Jones had established four mitigating circ*mstances: (1) Jonessuffered from long-term substance abuse; (2) that problem may becaused by genetic factors and head trauma; (3) he was under theinfluence of alcohol and drugs at the time of the murders; and (4)he was abused as a child. 9 id., at 2465. The courtconcluded that these circ*mstances were “not sufficientlysubstantial to outweigh the aggravating circ*mstances,” so itsentenced Jones to death. Ibid. The Arizona Supreme Courtaffirmed after “review[ing] the entire record” and “independentlyweighing all of the aggravating and mitigating evidence presented.”Jones, 185 Ariz., at 492, 917 P.2d, at 221.CJones sought state postconviction review onthe theory that defense counsel was ineffective. Jones argued thathis attorney should have retained an independent neuropsychologist,rather than relying on Dr. Potts. The state court denied this claimbecause it “remember[ed]” that Dr. Potts “was a very good expert”at trial and “was defense oriented.” 7 Record 1950. Jones alsoclaimed that trial counsel failed to make a timely request forneurological or neuropsychological testing. But after holding anevidentiary hearing on this claim, the state court rejected it onthe merits. Jones then unsuccessfully sought review in the ArizonaSupreme Court. Order in State v. Jones, No.CR–00–0512–PC (Feb. 15, 2001); 1 Record 186.DJones next filed a habeas petition in FederalDistrict Court and reasserted his ineffective-assistance-of-counselclaims. See 28 U.S.C. §2254. The District Court held anevidentiary hearing but ultimately concluded that Jones could notshow prejudice because the additional information he presented“‘barely ... alter[ed] the sentencing profilepresented to the sentencing judge.’” Jones v.Schriro, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1043 (Ariz. 2006) (quotingStrickland, 466 U.S., at 700). The court reached thisconclusion based on its assessment of “the credibility of theparties’ witnesses,” including witnesses introduced by the State toundercut Jones’s claims. 450 F.Supp. 2d, at 1038. The NinthCircuit reversed. See Jones v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 626(2009). But this Court vacated that judgment and remanded for theNinth Circuit to determine whether, in light of Cullen v.Pinholster, 563 U.S.170 (2011), it had been proper to consider the new evidencepresented at the federal evidentiary hearing. See Ryan v.Jones, 563 U.S. 932 (2011).On reconsideration, the Ninth Circuit againgranted habeas relief. The panel held that it was permissible toconsider the new evidence[2] and concluded that there was a “reasonable probability”that “Jones would not have received a death sentence” if thatevidence had been presented at sentencing. Jones v.Ryan, 1 F.4th 1179, 1196, 1204 (CA9 2021). The panel’slengthy opinion made no mention of the aggravating factors, and itdid not consider the State’s rebuttal evidence.Arizona sought en banc review. The Ninth Circuitdenied the State’s petition, but the panel amended its opinion tomention the aggravating circ*mstances and to rebuke the DistrictCourt for “weigh[ing] the testimony of [competing] experts againsteach other.” Jones v. Ryan, 52 F.4th 1104, 1128(2022).Ten judges dissented from the denial of en bancreview. Judge Ikuta, joined by two other judges, argued that thepanel should have deferred to the state postconviction review courton the Strickland prejudice inquiry. Judge Bennett, joinedby eight others, assumed without deciding that the panel couldconsider the new evidence. But he asserted that the panel floutedStrickland by crediting “questionable, weak, and cumulativemitigation evidence” as “enough to overcome ...weight[y] ... aggravating circ*mstances.” 52F.4th, at 1155 (dissenting opinion). If not corrected, JudgeBennett wrote, the panel’s errors would enable “courts toimproperly grant sentencing relief to capital defendants who havebeen convicted of the most horrific crimes.” Id., at1137.We granted certiorari to review the NinthCircuit’s interpretation and application of Strickland. 601U.S. ___ (2023).IIJones claims that his Sixth Amendment right tothe effective assistance of counsel was violated during thesentencing phase of his capital trial. To succeed on such a claim,a defendant must show that counsel provided a “deficient”performance that “prejudiced” him. Strickland, 466U.S., at 687. When an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claimis based on counsel’s performance at the sentencing phase of acapital case, a defendant is prejudiced only if “there is areasonable probability that, absent [counsel’s] errors, thesentencer ... would have concluded that the balance ofa*ggravating and mitigating circ*mstances did not warrant death.”Id., at 695. “A reasonable probability is a probabilitysufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. That requires asubstantial, not just conceivable, likelihood of a differentresult.” Pinholster, 563 U.S., at 189 (citation andinternal quotation marks omitted). This standard does not require adefendant to show that it is more likely than not that adequaterepresentation would have led to a better result, but “[t]hedifference” should matter “only in the rarest case.”Strickland, 466 U.S., at 697. To determine whether aprisoner satisfies this standard, a court must “consider thetotality of the evidence before the judge or jury”—both mitigatingand aggravating. Id., at 695.The Ninth Circuit departed from thesewell-established rules in at least three ways. First, it failedadequately to take into account the weighty aggravatingcirc*mstances in this case. As noted, the panel’s initial opiniondid not mention those circ*mstances at all. After the Statepetitioned for rehearing and 10 judges voted to grant the petition,the panel issued an amended opinion that at least mentioned theaggravating circ*mstances, but it failed to give them the weightthat they would almost certainly be accorded by an Arizonasentencing judge.Second, the Ninth Circuit applied a strangeCircuit rule that prohibits a court in a Strickland casefrom assessing the relative strength of expert witness testimony.See 52 F.4th, at 1128–1129. This rule is clearly unsound.Determining whether a defense expert’s report or testimony wouldhave created a reasonable probability of a different result if ithad been offered at trial necessarily requires an evaluation of thestrength of that report or testimony. And where a prosecutionexpert has expressed a contrary opinion, it is hard to see how acourt could decide how much weight to give the defense expertwithout making a comparative analysis.Third, the Ninth Circuit held that the DistrictCourt erred by attaching diminished persuasive value to Jones’smental health conditions because it saw no link between thoseconditions and Jones’s conduct when he committed the three murders.See id., at 1129. The Ninth Circuit seemed to suggest thatthis conclusion was supported by Eddings v. Oklahoma,455 U.S.104 (1982), but that is not so. Eddings held that asentencer may not “refuse to consider ... any relevantmitigating evidence.” Id., at 114. It did not holdthat a sentencer cannot find mitigating evidence unpersuasive. Seeid., at 114–115 (emphasizing that “[t]he sentencer... may determine the weight to be given relevantmitigating evidence”).Picking up what he takes to be the implicationsof these three features of the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, Jonesargues that a habeas petitioner is entitled to relief whenever heor she “presents substantial evidence of the kind that a reasonablesentencer might deem relevant to the defendant’s moralculpability.” Brief for Respondent 14. Whether or not this rulerepresents a fair extrapolation of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning,it is squarely at odds with the established understanding ofprejudice, which requires a “reasonable probability” of a differentresult. Imagine a defendant with the worst possible aggravatingcirc*mstances, say, multiple, vulnerable victims; torture; alengthy record of violent crime; no remorse; and a vow to killagain if given the chance. According to Jones, if the defense isable to show that trial counsel failed to produce any mitigatingevidence that can be characterized as “substantial,” the defendantmust be resentenced. But in such a case, where the aggravatingfactors greatly outweigh the mitigating evidence, there may be no“reasonable probability” of a different result. Thus, Jones’sargument is squarely inconsistent with Strickland.IIIWith the proper understanding ofStrickland in mind, we turn to the prejudice issue in thiscase. Most of the mitigating evidence Jones presented at thefederal evidentiary hearing was not new, and what was new would notcarry much weight in Arizona courts. Conversely, the aggravatingfactors present here are extremely weighty. As a result, there isno reasonable probability that the evidence on which Jones relieswould have altered the outcome at sentencing.AWe begin with the mitigating evidence. In theDistrict Court, Jones introduced evidence of (1)mentalillness, (2)cognitive impairment caused by a history of headtrauma, (3)childhood abuse, and (4)substance abuse.Jones claims that this evidence requires resentencing, but as theDistrict Court aptly observed, this evidence “would barely havealtered the sentencing profile presented to the sentencing judge,”and it is insufficient to show prejudice. Strickland, 466U.S., at 699–700.1Jones claims that his newly proffered evidenceshows that he suffers from “PTSD, AD/HD, mood disorder, [and]bipolar depressive disorder.” Brief for Respondent 45. But it isnot reasonably likely that this evidence would have resulted in adifferent sentence.Arizona courts had already received testimonythat Jones “suffers from a major mental illness,” likely a “form ofBipolar Affective Disorder.” 4 Record 1070; 10 id., at 2567.Yet they declined to give this evidence much weight because Jonesdid not “establish a causal connection between his alleged mentalillness and his conduct on the night of the murders.” Jones,185 Ariz., at 492, 917 P.2d, at 221; accord, State v.Prince, 226 Ariz. 516, 542, 250 P.3d 1145, 1171 (2011)(discounting poor mental health when no “expert could establish[the defendant’s] mental state on the night of the shootings”);State v. Boggs, 218 Ariz. 325, 343, 185 P.3d 111, 129(2008) (same).Jones’s new evidence did not fix that problem.One of Jones’s experts reiterated that Jones has a mood disorder,but he did not express an opinion on whether that disorder affectedJones on the night of the murders. 4 Record 823–825. Two expertsdiagnosed Jones with PTSD, but neither testified that heexperienced such symptoms at the time of the murders. 2 id.,at 506–508; id., at 451–453. Likewise, no expert linkedJones’s AD/HD to the murders; indeed, one of the State’s witnessestestified that there is no link between that disorder and violence.Id., at 459. Because none of Jones’s experts provided a reallink between Jones’s disorders and the murders, their testimonywould have done him little good in the Arizona courts. SeeState v. Poyson, 250 Ariz. 48, 53, 58, 475 P.3d 293,298, 303 (2020) (failure to link mitigating evidence to the crimemay diminish its weight); State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz.589, 608, n.12, 863 P.2d 881, 900, n.12 (1993) (“[E]vidence of causationis required before mental impairment can be considered asignificant mitigating factor”).2Next, Jones introduced evidence that hesuffers from cognitive impairment caused by physical trauma that hesuffered during his mother’s pregnancy, at birth, and later inlife. Brief for Respondent 44. But there is no reason to think thatthis evidence would have meaningfully changed how the state courtviewed the case.Arizona courts had already heard extensiveevidence about Jones’s head trauma and cognitive impairment. Forinstance, the sentencing court learned that Jones’s biologicalfather knocked his mother down stairs when she was pregnant withhim, 4 Record 1067, 9 id., 2523, that his birth wastraumatic, ibid., and that he was physically abused by hisfirst stepfather, 4 id., at 1067. The sentencing court knewthat Jones had been knocked unconscious as the result of threefalls during childhood and adolescence and a mugging in his lateteens. Id., at 1068, 1087; 9 id., at 2526, 2528–2529;10 id., at 2556–2557, 2569, 2580. It also heard from Dr.Potts that Jones’s head trauma potentially contributed to hisbehavior. 4 id., at 1068, 1071. Yet it did not find thisevidence sufficient to warrant leniency. And after reviewing thesame evidence, the Arizona Supreme Court concurred. Jones,185 Ariz., at 492, 917 P.2d, at 221 (crediting Dr. Potts’sassumption that Jones had brain damage).Jones added little on this issue at hisevidentiary hearing. He alleged a few additional head injuries fromcar accidents and fights, but “there is no medical documentation tocorroborate any of these injuries.” Jones, 450 F.Supp.2d, at 1039, and n.11. And though his experts flagged ahandful of poor test scores and grades, Jones’s IQ and standardizedtest scores are mostly average. 2 Record 347, 358–376, 379–399; 3id., at 798. This vague evidence at most “corroborate[s]”testimony the Arizona courts already credited. Jones, 185Ariz., at 492, 917 P.2d, at 221. Introducing it “would haveoffered an insignificant benefit, if any at all.” Wong v.Belmontes, 558 U.S.15, 23 (2009) (per curiam).3Jones also alleges significant childhoodabuse. Brief for Respondent 44. Again, however, Arizona courts hadheard much on this topic. They knew that Jones’s father abused hispregnant mother, that his first stepfather beat both of them, andthat his grandfather introduced him to drugs at a young age. Andthey received testimony that any period of normalcy during Jones’schildhood was “too late” and “not strong enough to counter theearlier abuse.” 4 Record 1069–1070. They nevertheless concludedthat this abuse did not warrant leniency, primarily because itappeared unconnected to the murders. Jones, 185 Ariz., at490–491, 917 P.2d, at 219–220; 9 Record 2465.In federal court, Jones added two newallegations. First, he asserted that the grandfather who introducedhim to alcohol also sexually abused him. Second, he claimed thathis second stepfather, Randy, physically abused him. It is notlikely that these allegations would have moved the state courteither.The sexual-abuse allegation is entirelyuncorroborated. Jones did not mention it until his federal habeasproceedings. 2 id., at 503–504. And his mother and secondstepfather explained that they “never saw any indication that[Jones] may have been sexually abused by anyone, nor were theyaware of any sexual perpetrators in the family.” Record in No.2:01–cv–00384 (D Ariz., Feb. 13, 2006), ECF Doc. 172–3, p. 49.Arizona courts would give this self-reported and uncorroboratedevidence “little ... mitigating weight.” Statev. Sharp, 193 Ariz. 414, 425, 973 P.2d 1171, 1182 (1999);accord, State v. Gerlaugh, 144 Ariz. 449, 462,698 P.2d 694, 707 (1985).Jones’s physical-abuse allegation against Randyis not much more helpful. Granted, his sister seconded hisallegation. 4 Record 982–987. But other record evidence contradictsit. For instance, Jones told Dr. Potts that Randy was “quite sternand a disciplinarian yet certainly not physically abusive.”Id., at 1067–1068 (emphasis added). On another occasion wellbefore this litigation, Jones said that “[a]s far as I’mconcerned,” Randy “is my real dad[;] he’s the only one that hastreated me good. He has never hit me or anything.”Id., at 1020 (emphasis added). Given Jones’s “obvious motiveto fabricate,” Arizona courts would view this abuse allegation withsome “skepticism.” State v. Medrano, 185 Ariz. 192,194, 914 P.2d 225, 227 (1996); see also Gerlaugh, 144 Ariz.,at 462, 698 P.2d, at 707; State v. Carriger,143 Ariz. 142, 153, 692 P.2d 991, 1002 (1984). And even crediting the allegation,it suffers from the same weakness that led the Arizona courts todiscount Jones’s other abuse allegations: it is not causallyconnected to the murders.4Finally, Jones points to evidence of substanceabuse, namely, that his grandfather introduced him to drugs andalcohol when he was “only nine years old.” Brief for Respondent 44.But Jones’s history of substantive abuse was “well-documented” atthe time of sentencing. Jones, 185 Ariz., at 491, 917P.2d, at 220. The Arizona Supreme Court, for instance,recounted that “by the time [Jones] was 17 years old, he had usedmany types of drugs and was an alcoholic.” Ibid.; see also 4Record 1086–1088 (presentencing report noting that Jones beganconsuming alcohol and using drugs at 13). And that court gave thisfact “some mitigating weight.” Jones, 185 Ariz., at 491, 917P.2d, at 220. There is no reasonable chance that those courtswould reach a different result on a second look at essentially thesame evidence.BThe weakness of Jones’s mitigating evidencecontrasts sharply with the strength of the aggravatingcirc*mstances. These circ*mstances—multiple homicides, cruelty,pecuniary motivation, and murder of a child—are given great weightin Arizona. See State v. Garza, 216 Ariz. 56, 72, 163P.3d 1006, 1022 (2007) (multiple-homicides aggravator gets“‘extraordinary weight’”); Poyson, 250 Ariz., at57, 475 P.3d, at 302 (the cruelty and pecuniary-motivationaggravators are “particularly weighty”); State v.Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 406, 132 P.3d 833, 850 (2006) (youngage of the victim is a “compelling aggravating circ*mstanc[e]” infavor of the death penalty).Indeed, in a host of cases, the Arizona SupremeCourt has held that one or more of these aggravating circ*mstancesoutweighed mitigation evidence—even evidence that was “notinsubstantial.” State v. Hampton, 213 Ariz. 167, 185,140 P.3d 950, 968 (2006) (concluding that the multiple-homicidesaggravator outweighed evidence of a “horrendous childhood”); seealso Poyson, 250 Ariz., at 57–58, 475 P.3d, at 302–303(listing several cases in which the multiple-homicides aggravatoralone outweighed all mitigating circ*mstances); State v.McKinney, 245 Ariz. 225, 227, 426 P.3d 1204, 1206 (2018)(cruelty and pecuniary-motivation aggravators outweighed evidencethat a defendant had “endured a horrific childhood” and sufferedfrom mental illness). Conversely, Jones and his amiciidentify no cases in which the Arizona Supreme Court hasvacated the judgment of death in a case involving multiplemurders—let alone a case involving all of the aggravatingcirc*mstances present here. The absence of such a case stronglysuggests that Jones has no reasonable probability of escaping thedeath penalty.IVTo justify its contrary conclusion, the NinthCircuit pointed to “the Strickland prejudice analysisconducted by the Supreme Court” in “similar cases.” 52 F.4th,at 1131. In these cases, the Ninth Circuit stated, we foundprejudice when counsel failed to present “classic mitigatingevidence,” even though the defendants had committed “brutalcrimes.” Id., at 1133.A review of the precedents cited by the NinthCircuit shows that they are very different from the case now beforeus. In each of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel cases on whichthe Ninth Circuit relied, this Court found that defense counselintroduced little, if any, mitigating evidence at the originalsentencing. See Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S.30, 41 (2009) (per curiam); Williams v.Taylor, 529 U.S.362, 395–398 (2000); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S.374, 378, 393 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.510, 515, 534–535 (2003). Jones, by contrast, started with muchmore mitigation. And in most of the other cases, the sentencerfound only a few aggravating circ*mstances. See Porter, 558U.S., at 42 (three aggravators, two of which the sentencingjudge thought “were insufficient to warrant death”);Williams, 529 U.S., at 370, 398 (one aggravator);Wiggins, 539 U.S., at 537 (one aggravator). That is afar cry from the weighty aggravating circ*mstances present here.Poyson, 250 Ariz., at 57, 475 P.3d, at 302.*  *  *When a capital defendant claims that he wasprejudiced at sentencing because counsel failed to presentavailable mitigating evidence, a court must decide whether it isreasonably likely that the additional evidence would have avoided adeath sentence. This analysis requires an evaluation of thestrength of all the evidence and a comparison of the weight ofa*ggravating and mitigating factors. The Ninth Circuit did not heedthat instruction; rather, it downplayed the serious aggravatingfactors present here and overstated the strength of mitigatingevidence that differed very little from the evidence presented atsentencing. Had the Ninth Circuit engaged in the analysis requiredby Strickland, it would have had no choice but to affirm thedecision of the District Court denying habeas relief. We thereforereverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the casefor further proceedings consistent with this opinion.It is so ordered.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES_________________No. 22–982_________________RYAN THORNELL, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OFCORRECTIONS, PETITIONER v. DANNY LEE JONESon writ of certiorari to the united statescourt of appeals for the ninth circuit[May 30, 2024]Justice Jackson, dissenting.In its search for legal error in this capitalhabeas case, the Court makes many mistakes of its own, includingmisreading the Ninth Circuit’s opinion.[1]* I write separately to emphasize a particular misstep:the Court’s conclusion that “the Ninth Circuit all but ignored thestrong aggravating circ*mstances in this case.” Ante, at 1.In my view, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis satisfied its obligationsunder Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.668 (1984).Per our longstanding test for evaluating anineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in a capital case, a court“must consider the totality of the evidence” and ask “whether thereis a reasonable probability that, absent the [trial counsel’s]errors, the sentencer ... would have concluded that thebalance of aggravating and mitigating circ*mstances did not warrantdeath.” Id., at 695. That is precisely what the NinthCircuit did here. The panel not only evaluated the mitigatingevidence that Jones’s trial counsel failed to unearth, it alsospecifically considered all of the aggravating factors. SeeJones v. Ryan, 52 F.4th 1104, 1131 (CA9 2022).To assess prejudice, it then reasoned extensively—byanalogy—considering precedent where both the Circuit and this Courthad granted habeas relief even in the presence of similaraggravators. See id., at 1131–1133.To be sure, the Ninth Circuit’s discussion ofthe aggravating factors was concise. But there is no benchmarklength for any such discussion. Indeed, this Court has grantedhabeas relief after similarly succinct evaluations of aggravatingfactors. See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum,558 U.S.30, 41–42 (2009) (per curiam) (discussing aggravators inone paragraph); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S.374, 390–393 (2005) (no discussion of aggravators);Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.510, 534–538 (2003) (same). We can hardly fault the NinthCircuit for using the same approach that this Court itself haspreviously used.Thus, to me, the Court’s claim that the NinthCircuit “all but ignored” the aggravators, ante, at 1, ringshollow. And the majority’s real critique does not appear to relateto the Ninth Circuit’s methodology. Rather, it merely takes issuewith the weight that the Ninth Circuit assigned to each of therelevant facts. I agree with Justice Sotomayor that we are not theright tribunal to parse the extensive factual record in this casein the first instance. That is doubly true where the Ninth Circuitcommitted no legal error in reviewing that record to begin with. Irespectfully dissent.